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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to explore the impacts of peacekeeping operations by the United 
Nations on the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. Previous research has consistently 
found evidence that civil wars increase human rights abuses; however, the literature has not 
adequately analyzed possible factors that could decrease this violence or the affects 
peacekeeping could have on human rights performances. The UN has four types of peacekeeping 
operations: observer, traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement. The results of a Heckman 
selection model for 57 countries that have experienced a civil war between 1976 and 2012 
suggest peacekeeping does impact human rights performances, although the impact is dissimilar 
for different types of missions and different types of human rights. In comparing mission 
effectiveness, multidimensional missions decrease human rights abuses more than 
observer/traditional missions and enforcement missions for current and future rights. 
Enforcement missions are associated with more abuses for current rights in comparison to 
traditional missions, but have fewer abuses five years in the future. Differences in time lags also 
suggest that the larger multidimensional and enforcement missions are more effective for future 
rights, whereas smaller traditional missions can be sufficient in impacting current human rights 
performances. These inferences apply to physical integrity rights, though, as the different 
mission types do not seem to affect civil liberty rights using the selection model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, the fields of human rights and peacekeeping have evolved and 
expanded into important issues and areas of study across both the international system and 
political science literature. Helping these two fields to prominence, the United Nations (UN) 
began the fight for peace and freedom at its inception in 1945 when it required all members to 
sign its Charter, pledging to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all” (“Chapter I,” 1945). Three years later the General Assembly 
adopted into force the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to explicitly describe the 
fundamental freedoms of all human beings to which the international community should aspire 
to uphold. That same year the Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its 
neighbors in the Middle East. Since then, the UN has deployed 69 peacekeeping operations with 
hundreds of thousands of personnel from more than 120 contributing countries (“History of 
Peacekeeping,” n.d.). Using the foundations for international human rights laws as laid out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN has also adopted into force nine human rights 
treaties, with all 193 UN members a voluntary party to at least one.  
However, it was not until decades after the UN introduced human rights and 
peacekeeping operations as internationally important multilateral issues that they gained 
prominence in the international system. In the 1970s human rights issues evolved into 
transnational movements in response to the publicized abuses of authoritarian regimes and the 
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introduction of human rights concerns in a rising number of countries’ foreign policies. The 
burgeoning issue of human rights permeated political science literature in an attempt to explain 
behavioral variation across states with empirical analysis. The number of studies regarding 
human rights expanded dramatically following the Cold War and a continuing wave of 
democratization that diffused and ingrained the growing human rights movement into an 
international effort (Cardenas, 2009). Peacekeeping operations are largely referred to as “the 
deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security” (Fortna and Howard, 
2008) and also gained in notoriety around the same time. Before 1989 peacekeeping was largely 
used in interstate conflicts, and the primary purpose of the few intrastate missions was to contain 
civil conflict in the hopes of preventing direct involvement by superpowers or to aid 
decolonization (Fortna, 2008). After the Cold War and end of the deadlock in the Security 
Council between the United States and Soviet Union, the amount of peacekeeping operations 
increased dramatically and the main purpose of the operations progressed into preventing the 
resumption of war. The end of the Cold War also brought a change in the peacekeeping 
literature. The few early studies focused on case histories and limited testing on interstate 
conflict. The amount of scholarly work increased with the number of missions after the Cold 
War and turned from optimistic pieces into case studies analyzing the failures and limitations of 
well-publicized fiascos. At the beginning of this century, the UN renewed its efforts at 
peacekeeping with the 2000 Brahimi Report and the international community renewed its 
positive view of the missions. Peacekeeping literature additionally changed, with more focus on 
rigorous quantitative testing to examine whether peacekeeping empirically impacts the likelihood 
and duration of peace during and after civil wars (Fortna and Howard, 2008).  
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Unfortunately, some of the most notorious United Nations peacekeeping operations are 
associated with egregious human rights abuses. The UN operation in Somalia withdrew from the 
country almost twenty years ago, leaving Somalis in the midst of a brutal power struggle 
between the government and multiple clans fighting for control. This left innocent civilians to 
encounter indiscriminant fire in the capital and abusive and arbitrary law in opposition-controlled 
territories. The true extent of destruction to the population is unknown, but all parties to the 
conflict have been accused of war crimes (“Somalia,” 2010). After this publicized failure, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda failed to stop the 100 days-long massacre of an 
estimated 800,000 people (“Rwanda,” 2011). One year later, the United Nations Protection Force 
in Bosnia failed to stop the culmination of a Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign in Srebrenica 
where the Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic killed and mutilated an estimated 7,800 Muslim 
males of all ages (Smith, n.d.). These and other well-publicized fiascos have called into question 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations to secure lasting peace and protect innocent 
civilians.  
Less publicized missions, though, have helped to secure the end of conflicts, foster 
reconciliation to prevent a resurgence of war, and aided in curbing violence. The UN operation 
in Liberia helped manage the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and helped 
other UN and international agencies to restore basic services to the population. The mission also 
implemented a series of humanitarian projects, including sending the first all-female unit of 
peacekeepers who were uniquely positioned to help the regularly targeted female war victims. 
The operation not only increased the number of women coming forward to report gender-based 
violence but further lowered the country’s overall crime rate (“UN Peacekeeping is a Success in 
Liberia,” n.d.). The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala helped demobilize the 
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Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) by overseeing the separation of forces 
between the Guatemalan Army and URNG and collecting URNG weapons and military 
equipment to ensure the process of reintegration by former combatants. It also assisted in 
numerous peacebuilding projects that reinforced the decline in political violence, including 
organizing human rights and judicial training programs by experts and installing an easy to use 
database for documenting abuses (“Missions Coming Down,” 2004). The United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) helped implement the Lomé Peace Agreement by 
disarming over 75,000 ex-combatants and assisting in holding the country’s first free and fair 
national elections. UNAMSIL was vital in instituting a war crimes tribunal and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The operation additionally helped the government end illegal 
diamond trading, which had fueled the conflict by giving rebels money to buy weapons, and 
worked with other UN agencies to generate jobs for unemployed youth and former fighters 
(“Sierra Leone,” n.d.). While missions viewed as successful are not as notorious as failed 
missions, the UN has indeed managed to positively impact states involved in the destructive 
violence of war and its chaotic aftermath. 
 With the continued prevalence of human rights abuses in the international system, 
especially in relation to civil wars, I want to identify whether peacekeeping is one factor that can 
limit the number of abuses committed by states. In light of the mixed record for perceived 
successes and failures, I specifically want to analyze the impact of different types of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations to identify which type is most effective in limiting abuses. 
There are four types of peacekeeping operations, although I combine two to form three groups. 
Observer and traditional missions are consent-based and are deployed to monitor and report 
compliance with cease-fire or war termination agreements. Multidimensional missions have 
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larger scopes and consist of both military and civilian personnel in order to engage in 
peacebuilding. Finally, enforcement missions consist of substantially more soldiers with the 
ability to use force in order to guarantee compliance with cease-fire/settlement agreements and to 
provide security (Fortna, 2008, p. 7). To test the different impacts of these three groups of 
peacekeeping operations on states’ human rights performances, I use panel data from 1976 to 
2012 for 57 countries. Because the UN does not send peacekeepers to every state involved in a 
civil war, I utilize a Heckman statistical model to test current and future impacts on human rights 
to account for selection bias in the Security Council’s decision to approve a mission. This model 
is also important as previous scholars argue UN missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts; 
therefore, abstaining from using a two-stage selection model could potentially underestimate the 
positive impacts of peacekeepers in relation to civil wars that do not experience peacekeeping. 
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACEKEEPING 
 One of the most consistent findings in the human rights literature is the positive 
relationship between human rights abuses and civil war (Poe and Tate, 1994; Krain, 1997; Keith, 
1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000; Keith, 2002; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; 
Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Murdie 
and Davis, 2012). Political restrictions, torture, unlawful imprisonment, politically-motivated 
murder, and censorship are all methods employed by governments wishing to “neutralize 
political opponents” or rebel leaders and increase the costs of resistance “to such a large extent 
that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy” (Davenport, 1995). While conflict of any kind 
would logically seem to coincide with rights abuses, international war does not share as strong or 
as significant a relationship with respect for human rights as civil war. The first study to test the 
link between human rights abuses and international and civil war is Poe and Tate (1994). They 
argue governments can impose restrictions and violence on citizens to combat internal threats to 
their authority and rule. They hypothesize states are more coercive when challenged by an armed 
and organized resistance, and using four measures of physical integrity rights they find civil wars 
to significantly and substantially increase the propensity to engage in repression. Poe, Tate, and 
Keith (1999) expanded this analysis to include a larger time frame, 1976 to 1993, and argue that 
the most extensive factor causing leaders to resort to repression is the existence of internal or 
international threats in the form of war. Their findings largely confirmed the results from the 
1994 study, although the effects of international war are slightly smaller and the effects of civil 
war slightly larger.  
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 Numerous other studies have since corroborated the strong relationship between human 
rights abuses and civil war, although they continue to analyze this indicator as a control variable 
and not as a main independent variable. Examining regime change, Zanger (2000) argues that 
“civil war presents the most serious and most violent domestic threat to elites in power,” who are 
likely to resort to the use of violence against domestic opponents (p. 223). She finds civil war to 
consistently be highly significant and international war to be less significant with regard to 
personal integrity rights between 1976 and 1993. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) analyze the 
impact of treaties on human rights performance and find civil war to be highly significant and 
negatively associated with personal integrity rights for 153 states in the same time period as 
Zanger, while international war has no effect. They argue governments “tend to be more 
coercive, defending their authority against internal challenges” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 
2005, p. 1388). Neumayer (2005) produces a similar study and additionally finds civil war to 
strongly affect both personal integrity rights using the Political Terror Scales and civil rights as 
measured by Freedom House, while international war is again largely insignificant. In the 
seminal study by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), in which they challenge the negative and 
linear relationship between democracy and personal integrity rights violations, civil war is again 
highly significant while international war is less significant with a much smaller effect for 147 
countries between 1976 and 1996. Murdie and Davis (2012) assess the impact of ‘shaming’ by 
international human rights organizations on targeted states’ human rights performance and argue 
civil wars can initiate instances where repression is utilized to “prevent coop attempts, temper 
opposition, and can even be condoned for security reasons” (p. 7). They find intra-state wars to 
be significantly and negatively associated with the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index for 130 
states between 1992 and 2004. Although these are but a few examples of empirical studies 
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including an indicator for civil war, they do demonstrate the variety within the human rights 
literature as to the different statistical models, measures of human rights performances, and 
independent variables of interest that continue to verify this prominent finding. These examples 
also demonstrate a lack of thorough theoretical explanations for why states have empirically 
abused citizens’ rights, and an even greater lack of explanations for why other parties to the civil 
war might violate the public’s rights.  
In contrast to the consistent and highly statistically significant relationship between 
human rights abuses and civil war, findings relating to the success or influence of peacekeeping 
are varied. The peacekeeping literature is largely concerned with the success or failure of 
peacekeeping operations, with the definition of “success” debated. Success is largely argued to 
mean one of three things: the mission fulfilled its mandate, the mission ended the conflict in 
which it intervened, or the mission enabled peace to endure longer post-conflict.  
Recent studies, though, emphasize the selection effect of peacekeeping missions, and 
argue that this can potentially bias the success rate of these missions due to the propensity to get 
involved in more ‘difficult’ cases. Examining the post-Cold War era, Gilligan and Stedman 
(2003) find the UN is most likely to intervene the more severe a conflict, as measured by the 
amount of deaths, and the longer the duration of the war. They also found UN peacekeeping 
operations are less likely to be deployed to intrastate wars where there are large government 
armies. Fortna (2004) finds consent-based UN peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed after 
stalemates than wars that end in a decisive victory for one side, whereas the relationships are 
insignificant for enforcement operations. She also finds peacekeepers are not more likely to 
intervene in conflicts where a formal treaty has been signed, where there are identity conflicts, or 
with a large number of deaths. Fortna (2008) additionally finds UN consent-based Chapter VI 
9 
 
missions are more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, relatively strong 
rebel groups, smaller government armies, and rougher terrain. Enforcement-based Chapter VII 
missions “are more likely in less democratic states, where levels of mistrust are higher, and 
where there are multiple factions” (Fortna, 2008, p. 45). Also analyzing the post-Cold War era, 
Hultman (2013) finds the number of civilians killed increases the likelihood of UN peace 
operations, especially when civilians are specifically targeted, as well as the likelihood that the 
Security Council provides a more robust mandate and the use of force. Finally, Mullenbach 
(2005) contrasts the other findings by suggesting international-level factors impact the decisions 
to deploy peacekeeping missions more than state-level factors. Even though some of his results 
correlate with previously mentioned studies, he finds previous interaction and intervention by 
IGOs or global or regional powers to be some of the strongest influences on deployments, 
especially regarding UN peacekeeping. With this selection bias in mind, recent studies have been 
able to more aptly test the effectiveness of peacekeeping.  
On the question of peacekeeping success, quantitative analysis generally finds 
peacekeeping to help maintain peace after civil wars. Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, Doyle 
and Sambanis (2000) conclude peacekeeping operations are most successful at maintaining 
durable peace when missions have the appropriate capabilities and scope to help with 
institutional and political reform in the form of elections and democratization. Fortna (2004; 
2008) concludes peacekeeping significantly drops the risk of another round of fighting, 
especially after the Cold War and with consent-based missions. Using matching techniques, 
Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find UN peacekeeping is strongly and significantly related to longer 
post-war peace, although it is insignificant in shortening ongoing wars. Madhav (2013) argues 
UN missions indirectly contribute to durable peace by incorporating former rivals into the 
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“institutional setup of the postwar state” and ensuring rivals have a way to resolve their 
differences without violence (p. 366). Analyzing post-WWII civil wars, he finds UN operations 
are positively and significantly associated with the democratic process, which in turn positively 
impacts post-war peacebuilding. However, not all studies echo these positive results. Greig and 
Diehl (2005) argue peacekeeping can actually discourage conflict settlement and find there are 
no significant positive impacts on peace agreements, although the results are much more 
negative for interstate wars than civil wars. Sambanis (2008) finds UN peacekeeping only has 
short term effects on the durability of post-war settlements and political openness. He argues UN 
missions do not foster the economic growth required to sustain peace in the long term. The 
peacekeeping literature in general, though, views peacekeeping operations as effectively 
increasing the duration of peace after civil wars. However, it does not explore the relationship 
between peacekeeping operations and the propensity of civil war actors to engage in human 
rights abuses. 
Only one study specifically tries to combine these two fields. Murdie and Davis (2010) 
analyze the impact of peacekeeping on states’ human rights abuses after civil wars. They test all 
states with a history of at least one civil war in the past ten years for the time period 1980 to 
2004. They broadly define a peacekeeping intervention as “any intervention by an outside state 
or international organization into the internal affairs of a state with the goal of preventing a 
resumption of military hostilities or to provide an environment where negotiations can occur” 
(Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 50). Using four measures of human rights abuses as their dependent 
variables, they find the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention does not have any 
significant relationship with change in a state’s human rights performance. Missions that include 
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a humanitarian purpose, though, positively impact human rights performances for three years in 
the future, but not the present, and negatively impact future empowerment rights.  
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III. COMPARING MISSIONS’ ABILITIES TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
 “It can be argued that the exercise of force by a state is directly related to the magnitude 
of the opposition to its regime” (Aflatooni and Allen, 1991, p. 29). If one of the largest threats to 
governments consists of violent strategies of dissent (Davenport, 1995, p. 687), then opposition 
groups forcing the state into a civil war is one of the greatest challenges to political systems. For 
opposition groups to challenge the government enough to classify the country as experiencing a 
‘civil war,’ it means they have (even minimally) effective power, military capabilities, and/or 
public support. Otherwise, the government would prevent dissidents from escalading to the 
ultimate form of internal conflict. In response to this ‘magnitude’ of oppositional threat to their 
rule, government leaders can resort to physical and civil human rights violations to weaken their 
opponents’ capabilities. Failing to respond to serious dissent can lessen the state’s ability to 
extract resources from its territory and citizens, protect itself, effectively use its military, or 
continue to execute its day-to-day tasks (Krain, 1997, p. 335). Leaders could also be responding 
to citizens’ demands for violent action to neutralize dissident combatants if the groups are 
viewed as dangerous towards the public (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Politically weak and 
centralized states might use violence against citizens to quell rebel movements due to the 
inability of weak, inept, or corrupt local police or military to disband violent opposition groups, 
especially in periphery territories with limited administrative control (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 
75-76). Violent reaction to stop and deter rebels might be the only feasible option to financially 
or administratively weak officials, when they deem the relative cost of losing office or conceding 
to rebel demands too high. Moreover, under weak officials, unrestrained military and police units 
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can carry out their own abuses against citizens or react more harshly to opposition groups than 
intended by state leaders.  
In using repression to quell dissidents, governments can violate both physical integrity 
rights and civil liberty rights. To directly weaken the opposition, officials can use military or 
police forces to physically find rebels and torture, unlawfully detain, or execute them. Torturing 
can be used to extract strategic information or to deter further involvement in rebel groups. 
Violating citizens’ rights to due process can be used to hold rebels or suspected rebel supporters 
in secure locations to ensure they are unable to participate in their group’s activities. Killing 
opponents and suspected supporters is the ultimate act to ensure threatening combatants are 
unable to challenge the regime, and acts as a deterrent to others by substantially raising the cost 
of dissenting. The government could also engage in mass killings to eradicate rebel hierarchies 
simply because they are unsure of who is part of the opposition. Officials can additionally resort 
to harming civilians in order to directly destroy or weaken a rebel group’s support base, or to 
undermine the legitimacy of rebel groups by demonstrating that they cannot protect the public 
and would thus be an inadequate replacement for current leaders (Krain, 2005, p. 370). In 
addition to physical violations, political elites can respond to threats by abusing the public’s civil 
liberties. Officials can restrict political access and participation to keep opponents from gaining 
access to government offices. Moreover, they can restrict the freedom of speech, assembly and 
association, or expression and beliefs to prevent the messages and ideals of rebel groups from 
spreading to the mass public and inciting larger oppositional support. Elites could further control 
the flow of information by restricting news sources. In order to economically weaken rebel 
groups, political officials can restrict workers’ rights, trade unions, equality of the sexes, and 
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economic activity. All of these methods can be employed to help the incumbent government 
retain control over its citizens and state apparatuses.  
 Rebels additionally have incentives to engage in violence. Rebel groups typically have 
fewer resources than the government, due to less access to collecting rents, taxes, and orienting 
the economy in a way that benefits them. Also, groups rebel because they feel they are not 
benefiting enough from the status quo. If combatants are fighting to gain a greater share of 
economic benefits or in response to insufficiently compensated work (Ross, 2004, p. 41), then it 
most likely means they are not doing as well financially as they deem fair and thus have less 
resources to challenge the government. Therefore, to substantially challenge the government, 
rebel groups can resort to guerrilla tactics, which can indiscriminately harm everyone in the 
surrounding area. They might resort to physical violence against civilians in order to deter those 
who may fight against them or to frighten those who are not participating in anti-system behavior 
to join the rebel organization (Davenport, 1995, p. 687). Moreover, they could use violence to 
disrupt the provision of public goods or to demonstrate the government’s inability to protect its 
citizens in order to dissuade the population from supporting the state’s regime (Wood, Kathman, 
and Gent, 2012, p. 648). When low on resources, guerrilla tactics and targeting unarmed civilians 
are relatively low-cost mechanisms with potentially high payoffs in gaining attention and 
demonstrating abilities or resolve to the government. These mechanisms are especially cost-
effective when rebels do not have the capacity to directly fight military or police forces. In 
addition, rebels may not have access to the intelligence technology of the government, so they 
may resort to torture in order to acquire information. Violent opposition groups can not only kill, 
torture, or kidnap civilians, but they can also impede on the public’s civil rights. Although 
opposition groups cannot legally impinge on citizens’ rights since they are not officially 
15 
 
members of the government, they can use violence to frighten the public from exercising their 
rights to free speech, assembly, equality, or government participation. Finally, wars are violent 
by nature, and that violence is seldom limited to armed combatants. Each side is trying to destroy 
the other by any means necessary in order to fulfill its goals, whether it be replacing the 
incumbent government, gaining autonomy over a territory, forcing policy changes, or retaining 
power.  
 The potential for violence and restrictions does not always end with the cessation of war. 
Without adequate compromises, implementation, or guarantees, war-ending agreements can fail 
and the country can dissolve back into war with all the abuses inherently associated with it. 
Unsatisfied parties and the absence of third-party intervention can also leave the public, former 
combatants, and government-affiliated personnel susceptible to retaliatory abuses. The 
incumbent or new government leaders can physically harm former members or supporters of 
opposition groups in anger over devastation suffered during the war and to deter future uprisings. 
In addition, the government can restrict civil liberties for the same purposes, or to ensure the 
public at large or specific groups remain economically and politically weak to prevent future 
threats. Rebel groups who feel they did not fully receive their deserved goals may violently lash 
out to demonstrate their contempt for the agreement or to cause a peace agreement to fail.  
Previous literature is clear about this relationship between human rights abuses and civil 
wars, but it is unclear about how peacekeeping operations can impact it. There is also 
disagreement in the literature about which components of peacekeeping are the most essential in 
maintaining peace. Being that previous literature found civil wars to significantly and 
substantially affect human rights performance more than international wars, this paper seeks to 
compare the three groups of UN peacekeeping operations and their ability to decrease the human 
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rights abuses associated with civil wars. First, observer and traditional missions act as a conduit 
of credible information to both sides of a conflict and to the international system. The 
peacekeepers allow belligerents to credibly signal information to the opposing side without 
resorting to human rights abuses. Peacekeepers also report their observances to the international 
community, which can then “shame and blame” belligerents into using avenues other than 
violence to achieve their goals. Second, multidimensional missions can decrease the amount of 
abuses committed more than the previous group since they go beyond monitoring and reporting 
to implementing peacebuilding components. These missions include substantial civilian elements 
to ensure representation by opposing parties in the post-war state structure and aid in 
implementing a more non-violent system. Multidimensional missions additionally put more 
direct effort into humanitarian aims. Third, enforcement missions help to physically ensure 
security for fighting factions and civilians and deter abusive behavior with the threat of force.  
All UN peacekeeping operations entail monitoring the implementation of the country’s 
cease-fire agreement and reporting on the adherence of the agreement by all fighting factions. 
The mandates of observer missions do not go beyond monitoring and reporting. Traditional 
missions can include the creation of buffer zones, mine clearance, minor military or police 
training, facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops or refugees, and facilitating humanitarian 
aid programs. Both observer and traditional missions are generally only lightly armed, with strict 
instructions to refrain from using force other than in self-defense. They also generally have 
consent from all warring factions and attempt to remain unbiased toward any particular party. 
Through consent and neutrality, international attention, and other non-military mechanisms, 
these types of peacekeeping missions reduce the amount of human rights abuses associated with 
civil war by facilitating credible information between belligerents and encouraging non-violent 
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behavior. However, these missions typically have the least amount of personnel, financial 
support, and mandate expansiveness, which could limit the ability to quickly and decisively end 
hostilities in a manner conducive to future respect for human rights.  
Observer and traditional missions place more emphasis on obtaining consent from 
warring parties and maintaining neutrality than multidimensional and enforcement missions. 
Consent by all parties in a civil war for the UN to establish a mission in-country is important 
because it signals the warring factions have at least some desire for peace and some desire to 
carry out their cease-fire agreement, at least for the near future. By agreeing to be monitored by a 
third-party as international as the United Nations, warring factions know they are involving 
themselves in an organization that is not only important in recognizing the legitimate rulers of a 
state but also one that holds a lot of international attention. For the other types of peacekeeping 
operations, consent is not always given by all belligerents. If a faction does not consent to the 
operation, it indicates they believe the operation will harm their chances of reaching their goals. 
Therefore, non-consenting parties would be more likely to continue or increase violent behavior 
in an attempt to undermine the operation (Diehl, 1988, p. 503). Additionally, consent allows 
peacekeepers to gather more information about the war situation and the actions and motivations 
of each group. Howard (2008) argues consent can “be a precondition for learning,” and increases 
the abilities of peacekeepers to collect and disperse information by being able to interact with 
local populations and members of each faction (p. 328). Neutrality is also significant because it 
facilitates the continuation of consent for the mission. If the operation is perceived as biased 
toward one side, other parties may not want to continue cooperating since it might hinder their 
ability to gain or retain power. Other states may also disagree with the biased party chosen to 
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help win the conflict, and consequently might withdraw resources or counteract the mission by 
sending their own oppositional support.  
Peacekeeping operations are important because they allow for a less-violent alternative 
for the transmission of credible information. Because warring groups in a civil war are all 
working to achieve a different goal, information is difficult to gather and send because of the 
strategic incentives to remain secretive and misrepresent. It is not advantageous for any group to 
reveal any or all of its true intentions, motivations, resources/capabilities, bases, supporters, 
resolve, or costs. Therefore, combatants may resort to the use of torture, unlawful detention, 
murder, mutilation, or other physical integrity abuses to force individuals to reveal credible 
information. Sending information through credible signals is also difficult due to the incentive to 
misrepresent. Peacekeepers reduce information asymmetries by transmitting intelligence 
between groups without the use of violence. Since peacekeepers are part of a multinational 
organization committed to securing world peace, belligerents can be more trusting of information 
relayed through them concerning other parties. The neutrality of observational and traditional 
missions also makes the information relayed more credible since there is no incentive for 
peacekeepers to misrepresent or withhold vital information from cease-fire implementations. UN 
peacekeepers strive to remain neutral and truthful so that they will not compromise future 
missions or the willingness of future combatants to consent to interventions. By closely 
monitoring the actions of each group, peacekeepers can confirm and reassure that all groups are 
genuinely trying to fulfill the directives of cease-fire agreements. This, at the very least, makes it 
harder for any group to launch a surprise attack, stockpile resources for later attacks, or renege 
on other aspects of the agreement. Therefore, belligerents can at least lessen the naturally 
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mistrustful nature of war by sending and receiving signals and information through peacekeepers 
instead of resorting to physical integrity abuses.  
   The international attention that accompanies UN operations can further reduce rights 
abuses by deterring belligerents from using violence and by preventing unintentional escalations 
of violence. Peacekeepers report noncompliance to an agreement and any violence carried out by 
each faction. Parties to a conflict are generally dependent upon some form of foreign aid or 
foreign resources. Using violence could put future aid in jeopardy, especially since other 
organizations are generally more willing to give resources to conflicts that have peacekeepers on 
the ground for assistance (Fortna, 2008, p. 90-92). Moreover, abusive behavior could result in 
sanctions, which could economically hurt belligerents resulting in less available resources. The 
UN can additionally maintain the legitimacy of the government or grant legitimacy to rebel 
groups. Committing violent acts, especially towards the civilian population, could result in the 
loss of a group’s legitimate power to the international community, which could affect how 
legitimately they are viewed by the domestic population. This is especially important to rebel 
groups who are fighting for control of the government or if either side has an incentive to win 
future elections (Ibid.). In addition to reporting actions to the international community, 
peacekeepers can help prevent unnecessary violence through retaliation or misunderstandings. 
Instead of having to choose between retaliation and looking weak, a group can respond to attacks 
by reporting the incident to peacekeepers who can then relay the information to the international 
community. Furthermore, by facilitating a credible flow of information, peacekeepers can 
prevent misunderstandings from escalading into abusive behavior (Ibid., p. 94-95).   
Despite these positive influences that observer and traditional missions can impart on 
parties to a civil war, the missions lack the mandate scopes and resources of multidimensional 
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and enforcement missions. As previously stated, observer and traditional missions are not 
authorized to physically protect local populations from violence or ensure their civil and political 
rights are respected. They must simply monitor and report the treatment of civilians, not 
interfere. Even if peacekeepers on the ground wanted to interfere, these missions typically have 
limited resources. Compared to multidimensional and enforcement missions, they have 
significantly less military and civilian personnel and budgets, which impedes their ability to 
physically reach all conflict areas in a nation or all areas instantaneously. These limits confine 
peacekeepers’ abilities to effectively deter warring factions from using violence. Furthermore, 
these limitations can provoke warring factions into using more violence. Authorizing observer or 
traditional missions in lieu of the other two types can be a signal to combatants that the UN has a 
weak resolve for the conflict and/or that they are not prepared to risk resources for protecting 
civilians (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, 2013a, p. 880), which could decrease the effectiveness 
of ‘shaming and blaming’ reports of abuses to the international community. Seeing peacekeepers 
could also give civilians an unrealistic sense-of-security and lead to them wandering out of safety 
to become targets to combatants who feel limited pressure to avoid attacking civilians. In 
addition, if warring factions have reason to believe the Security Council will authorize one of the 
other two larger mission types in the future, government or rebel fighters could carry out 
violence in the urgent need to “secure civilian loyalty, deter civilian defection, restock their 
fighting ranks, and acquire more resources” before more peacekeeping personnel arrive to 
solidify an unfavorable status quo (Ibid., p. 881). Alternatively, combatants could conclude that 
the international community has low resolve for ending their conflict and respond to a 
heightened future security dilemma by committing mass abuses to secure resources and support 
for a resurgence of warfare when the peace agreement fails (Kathman and Wood, 2012, p 19). 
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The neutrality of these missions can also hinder their effectiveness by taking longer to 
resolve the issues in dispute. To remain impartial, observer/traditional operations must refrain 
from supporting one side or the other. Therefore, wars with neutral interveners have been argued 
to last longer and been found to be less likely to remain settled due to the fact that they do not 
‘tip the balance’ with military weapons or soldiers and help one side to victory (Toft 2010; 
Regan 2002). Quick and decisive victories can create more stable and lasting peace as compared 
to negotiated settlements due to the destruction of the enemy, or at least a credible threat of harm 
if the opposition reneges with violence, and by effectively demonstrating the capabilities of each 
side (Toft, 2010, p. 33-34). Negotiated settlements do not always clarify which side would have 
won the conflict, which could lead to a lapse back into fighting for the side that feels thwarted by 
the peace agreement. Although decisive military victories can lead to human rights violations 
post-conflict through revenge violence to the opposition or to quell resistance to the outcome, not 
to mention abuses that occur through defeating all opponents, they can also prevent future 
violations that occur from a resumption of hostilities. Conversely, negotiated settlements may 
prevent abuses in the short term with peace agreements but may not in the long term if fighting 
resumes. On the contrary, it can be argued that the longer wars of negotiated settlements create 
environments more conducive to stable peace and respect for human rights through information 
convergence and war weariness. Through repeated confrontation, all sides to a conflict slowly 
gain information on their opponents and eventually converge on the knowledge of each group’s 
capabilities and resolve, which leads to a cessation of hostilities because each side knows who 
will win. Long durations of violence can also leave all parties weary to more violence, thus 
decreasing prospects for human rights violations in the future.  
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 Even though observer and traditional missions are mainly focused on simply monitoring 
and reporting events instead of militarily forcing belligerents to comply with cease-fire 
agreements or engaging in better human rights practices, they can still be effective in deterring 
abusive behavior through transparency and raising the costs of violence. States left on their own 
do not have the same conduit of credible information or the same incentives to discontinue or 
lessen abusive behavior. These impacts, though, can be overshadowed by insufficient mandate 
scopes and resources and the ability to quickly and decisively end hostilities. Therefore, I expect 
there will be no significant impact with reducing current human rights abuses as compared to the 
other two types. I also do not expect traditional missions to impact future human rights 
performances because any deterring impact will occur while peacekeeping personnel are still on 
the ground and will cease once the international community has deemed that the conflict is either 
finished or not worth the cost of intervention. Furthermore, since the focus of these missions is 
mainly concerned with implementing cease-fire agreements, I expect any statistical significance 
to decrease physical integrity rights, but not necessarily civil liberty rights. Because personal 
violence, such as murder and torture, is viewed as more horrific than civil liberty abuses, such as 
restricting free speech, the international community is more forceful at preventing the former 
over the latter. Therefore, combatants should be more reluctant to engage in physical integrity 
abuses than civil liberty abuses for fear of an enlarged peacekeeping operation or negative 
consequences in other aspects of the international community.    
Multidimensional operations go beyond observer and traditional missions by including 
peacebuilding measures. While they still continue to deter abusive behavior through monitoring 
and reporting, multidimensional operations go a step further and attempt to build and change 
state institutions to reinforce belligerents’ behavioral change and ensure better human rights 
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performances for the post-conflict state. Multidimensional mandates can include:  organizing and 
supervising elections, investigating human rights abuses and/or holding trials for abusers, 
judicial reform, delivering humanitarian assistance, repatriating refugees, military and police 
training, security sector reform, social and economic recovery and development programs,  
facilitating the creation of a stable government with democratic principles, or even temporarily 
administering a territory (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, p. 2). Not all missions 
include the same mandates, but multidimensional missions generally include at least some 
human rights aspects and/or state reconstruction toward democratization. Multidimensional 
operations can decrease the amount of human rights abuses associated with civil wars not only 
by deterring factions from engaging in abusive behavior, but by helping to build or restructure a 
state’s system to better respect human rights.  
In addition to facilitating a system conducive to protecting physical and civil rights, these 
missions can help solve some of the problems that resulted in a civil war, thus facilitating an end 
to civil war related abuses. After more than a hundred years of colonial rule, the United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia intensively worked to provide the country 
with its first elections through:  voter education, establishing polling stations, ballot-box 
supervising to guard against fraudulent voting, policing electoral stations to keep voters safe, 
organizing regular meetings of the leaders of all parties in the election (who had never before 
convened) to create a political Code of Conduct, and helping to negotiate the release of political 
prisoners and repatriate refugees for a comprehensive voter turnout. UNTAG even went so far as 
to “neutralize” the old biased colonial newspaper and broadcasting systems prone to propaganda 
perpetuating colonialism and apartheid and sent special missions to neighboring states to 
physically track down missing Namibians and verify they were not being detained (“Namibia,” 
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n.d.). By ensuring free and fair elections, peacekeepers can protect against unlawful political 
exclusion and help to create a stable government with democratic values that incorporates all 
groups into the post-civil war system. Power-sharing institutions can lessen security concerns by 
ensuring each group is represented and in a position to influence future decisions of the state 
(Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Political power-sharing can protect against one group gaining 
enough power to abuse the rights of others and can act as a ‘check’ to prevent abusive policies 
from evolving. Walter (1997) found institutional power-sharing arrangements are not only 
crucial to long-term peace, especially in the absence of decisive military victories, but can also 
offset limited security guarantees allowing the UN to facilitate peaceful conflict settlements 
without having to get the Security Council to declare a Chapter VII and deploy a substantial 
amount of troops (p. 361-362).  
In conjunction to political power-sharing, military power-sharing and economic 
restructuring can help combat abuses committed in the post-civil war state system. Military 
power-sharing keeps one group from gaining enough power to abuse the rights of the other, 
while forcing each group to work together and thus lessening the differences between the two 
groups and the incentive to carry out violence against one another. By re-training and monitoring 
unified military and police forces, peacekeepers can deter the use of torture, unlawful 
imprisonment, forced disappearances, and murder (Fortna, 2008, p. 99-100).  Reforming and 
monitoring the judicial sector further helps lessen abusive behavior by ensuring abusers are 
punished, which can deter potential abusers and retaliators from engaging in abusive behavior. 
Moreover, an independent judiciary can ensure political officials maintain respect for citizens’ 
civil liberties and do not infringe on their abilities to express and exercise their beliefs. 
Additionally, economic reconstruction might relieve some of the pressures that resulted in 
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fighting by helping disadvantaged groups gain economic leverage within the system and can 
make them less vulnerable to abusive behavior. The peacebuilding that is important in 
multidimensional missions is intended to institute a structure conducive to peaceful conflict 
resolution (Ibid., p. 101) and ensure no group in society is vulnerable to physical or civil 
infringements.  
 Furthermore, multidimensional operations should have a greater impact on lessening 
human rights abuses because they specifically include humanitarian objectives. The deterrence 
associated with observer and traditional missions is greatly increased not only because there are 
larger soldier and civilian components, but also because the missions are specifically searching 
for abuses and actively trying to discourage abusive behavior. While observer and traditional 
missions do report on human rights abuses, it is not always a focus. The focus for 
observer/traditional missions is more on whether the sides are following the accords of the cease-
fire agreement, and peacekeepers can even deem it harmful to the completion of the mission by 
dwelling on human rights concerns. Missions with humanitarian objectives not only monitor 
abuses but investigate complaints and give more detailed reports to the UN and the international 
community that specifically focus on abusive actions. Restructuring of the government is also 
carried out with humanitarian objectives in mind, especially with training soldiers and police to 
respect human rights and ensuring the judicial system is active and ethical. Operations further 
restructure the education system, as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) accomplished, by incorporating human rights studies into university curriculums and 
providing education and expertise to teachers, health professionals, and public officials. 
Moreover, UNTAC trained judges, defense lawyers, public defenders, justice officials, and 
intensely monitored and investigated all prisoners suspected of politically motivated detention 
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while pressuring authorities to improve their situation to the fullest possible extent (“Cambodia,” 
n.d.). Furthermore, the emphasis on democratization can help decrease human rights abuses 
through power-sharing as well as forcing leaders to be accountable to citizens by giving citizens 
the right to vote abusive or potentially repressive leaders out of office. By laying the foundation 
for a state with democratic principles, peacekeepers can ensure future respect for human rights, 
as numerous studies have found democracies to be associated with a decrease in human rights 
abuses (McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and 
Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000; 
Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).  
However, as mentioned previously, negotiated settlements have been found to fail more 
often than decisive victories, and part of the reason behind this involves the negative 
consequences of political, economic, and military power-sharing. Survivors of civil wars must 
decide how political and economic benefits will be divided throughout all parties to the conflict 
and across the population at large. The incumbent government faces a significant cost in 
redistributing the political and economic benefits it fought so hard to retain, to opponents who 
have correspondently fought as hard to take full control of those benefits (Toft, 2010, p. 42-43). 
Although peacekeepers actively seek to include all factions in the post-war state system, they 
also tend to ‘freeze’ the military status quo when they arrive to intervene, which usually favors 
the government. By not allowing a continuation of fighting, rebels are robbed of the opportunity 
to win and change the system in their favor. This dissatisfaction with the antebellum status quo, 
coupled with distributional problems, creates the potential for defection from the peace 
settlement. As Werner and Yuen (2005) argue, durable settlements require distributional terms to 
reflect belligerents’ convergent expectations about military consequences sans agreement. Even 
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with democratization and free and fair elections, multidimensional missions cannot ensure 
respect for future human rights if the foundations of the post-civil war state are viewed as 
unrepresentative or if one side can easily be blocked from power with winner-take-all elections 
or laws that can easily be changed (Walter, 1997, p. 362). Civil liberty restrictions could 
additionally be employed by the majority to further eschew power from the group disadvantaged 
at the time of the peace settlement. Minorities can still be victimized or have their rights 
infringed upon if power is not distributed in a way that grants them enough influence to retain a 
voice and sufficient economic income.   
I hypothesize multidimensional missions to have a positive and significant impact on 
respect for human rights, despite the potential for disruptions caused by the distributional 
consequences of peacebuilding. The additional objectives of multidimensional mission mandates 
over observer and traditional missions allow for peacekeepers to go beyond deterrence and 
information transmissions to actively promote better human rights practices and install respectful 
behavior into the state structure. Therefore, because multidimensional missions have elements of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding through humanitarian objectives and building state structures to 
respect human rights, I hypothesize multidimensional missions to be negative and significantly 
related to human rights abuses in the present and future. Since multidimensional missions put 
forth the most effort into ensuring the state will continue to make positive progress after the 
mission is completed, I expect multidimensional missions to have the largest impacts on future 
human rights performances. Also due to their peacebuilding nature, I hypothesize 
multidimensional missions to have the largest effects on civil liberty rights.  
Enforcement operations additionally go beyond simple monitoring and reporting by 
helping to resolve the credible commitment problem of war-ending settlements through the use 
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of force. These missions are generally authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
include a significant military component to carry out large-scale combat operations. Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to grant peacekeeping missions the right to 
use force to maintain international peace and security (“Chapter VII,” 1945). While the other 
types of peacekeeping operations generally obtain consent from all groups participating in the 
cease-fire agreement, enforcement missions are not required to gain consent from all sides nor 
obligated to depart if consent is withdrawn. The use of force can physically stop human rights 
abuses or it can further deter belligerents from resorting to abusive behavior because they know 
force will be used against them.  
 One of the major challenges to the success of war-ending agreements is the issue of 
credible commitments, and enforcement missions can provide security guarantees to prevent a 
lapse back into fighting. For a civil war to successfully end, combatants must lay down their 
weapons and consolidate into a single state with a single military force. This means adversaries 
make themselves vulnerable to exploitation if the opposing side does not follow through with 
demobilizing or sharing power. Once groups surrender their weapons and/or occupied territory 
they are unable to force the other side to comply with the terms of the agreement and unable to 
protect themselves from attacks (Walter, 1999). Self-enforcement is especially difficult in 
conflicts with strong distrust between combatants, multiple factions, substantial hostility, or lack 
of coherent leadership (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). Therefore, a third party can 
guarantee compliance for all groups by monitoring the situation and creating transparency about 
everyone’s actions. Furthermore, enforcement missions can deter noncompliance by threatening 
reneging groups with military action to force them to comply with the terms of the agreement or 
forcefully restore public order. They can also provide protection should one side renege and 
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attempt to attack an already demobilized group. Thus, peacekeepers raise the difficulty, and 
therefore cost, of cheating so that it no longer exceeds the payoff of implementing the remaining 
terms of the peace agreement. This makes “promises to cooperate gain credibility and 
cooperation becomes more likely” (Walter, 1997, p. 340). Therefore, enforcement missions can 
decrease the amount of human rights abuses that would have been suffered in their absence by 
preventing a lapse back into fighting and deterring belligerent groups from using violence to 
undermine peace agreements.  
 Numerous studies argue successful interventions require strong enforcement elements to 
maintain security with a credible threat of force (Walter, 1997; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 
2001; Toft, 2010; Kathman and Wood, 2012). Enforcement missions are characterized by 
significantly larger military elements than the other two types and can subsequently send a 
stronger signal of resolve by the international community to conclude the civil war and raise the 
political costs of ending the operation before its completion. Establishing enforcement missions 
sends a signal to belligerents that the international community is committing itself not only to 
forcefully securing the execution of a peace agreement but also to forcefully protecting civilians 
(Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 2013a). Authorizing troops to use force to protect civilians 
signals that the international community is deeply concerned about the welfare of the general 
population, which increases pressure on combatants to avoid violence more than traditional or 
multidimensional missions. Instead of potential future negative consequences in the form of 
sanctions, loss of legitimacy, etc., violent belligerents face an immediate punishment of 
retaliation by troops in the form of return fire. Moreover, soldiers can physically force reluctant 
belligerents to demobilize and turn in their weapons, reducing their ability to target and harm 
civilians. The authorization to use force further allows peacekeepers to create effective buffer 
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zones to separate combatants in order to reduce disruptions to cease-fire agreements and to create 
safe zones for civilians (Ibid., p. 879). Simultaneously, more personnel allows the operation to 
protect civilians throughout the country and leaves it less restricted as compared to traditional 
missions. Reaching larger swaths of the country and its inhabitants increases the operations’ 
ability to succeed and prevent abuses. 
 Furthermore, troops on the ground physically protect civilians and use force to stop 
abusers from committing violence. Soldiers defend designated safe areas from attacks, patrol 
villages for signs of violence or aggressors, silence deadly fire against civilians with 
reciprocation, and apprehend suspected war criminals to be tried for humanitarian atrocities. In 
addition, soldiers protect and aid humanitarian relief, which could help decrease the amount of 
abuses suffered from a lack of necessary resources. For example, soldiers stop factions from 
disrupting relief convoys by forcing belligerents to retreat or provide security detail for 
protection. It can be argued sending soldiers to forcefully stop perpetrators from committing acts 
of violence is preferable to economic sanctions. As stated previously, one of the deterrents 
associated with the other types of peacekeeping missions is the potential for sanctions to be 
placed on groups engaging in abusive behavior. Economic sanctions can sometimes result in 
hurting the regular citizens of a country more than the affluent leaders who capitalize on the 
available rents associated with sanctions. Peacekeeping soldiers can police countries torn apart 
by civil wars and specifically target abusive perpetrators without causing large-scale 
unintentional harm to innocent civilians (Lepard, 2002).   
 Even though enforcement missions are authorized to protect civilians and use force, it is 
dubious whether they actually possess the credibility and strength required to deter belligerents 
from resorting to violence. Walter (1997) states three conditions credible interveners must fulfill 
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in order to effectively solve the credible-commitment problem:  they must have self-interest in 
executing their commitments, they must have sufficient resources and will to punish treaty 
defectors, and they must be able to effectively demonstrate their resolve with costly signals (p. 
340-341). If the Security Council cannot commit a sufficient amount of troops or resources to the 
mission, then its ability to decrease human rights abuses diminishes. This echoes studies showing 
that as troop size increases, the chance of war reoccurring decreases (Hultman, Kathman, 
Shannon, 2013b) and the use of violence decreases (Kathman and Wood, 2012). Past 
enforcement missions, though, have been criticized for their lack of resolve and resources. For 
example, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) suffered from the 
beginning, with troops and resources that were slow to arrive on the ground, and throughout with 
unclear chains of command and poor communication and coordination between units and the 
states involved. UNOSOM II failed when it withdrew all personnel after the United States and 
Europeans withdrew troops due to widely publicized mission failures and troop deaths, which 
left Somalis at the violent mercy of warring factions (Howard, 2008, p. 27-28). In addition, 
reeling from the failure in Rwanda the UN authorized the largest peacekeeping force in its 
history to help the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The sheer volume of 
personnel from such a large dispersion of countries proved difficult to manage. Upwards of 
18,000 troops from 51 countries proved impossible to configure into a unified and robust mission 
to combat multiple warring factions and complete a complex mandate. The operation has 
additionally run into problems relating to contradictions in its mandate. While aiming to protect 
civilians, the operation is also essentially taking sides in the conflict by militarily supporting the 
country’s armed force (FARDC), which has habitually targeted the civilian population for rape, 
harassment, and homicide. Bosco Ntaganda, who has been convicted by the International 
32 
 
Criminal Court for conscripting child soldiers, is also a member of FARDC, which contradicts 
the mission’s goal to bring to justice those who commit humanitarian abuses (Clark, 2011). 
Therefore, not only can enforcement missions suffer from a lack of resolve or resources 
necessary to protect civilians, they can also be impeded by their superior size and complexity.   
I hypothesize enforcement missions to also have a greater and more statistically 
significant impact on human rights performances than observer and traditional missions, since 
they have the authority to use force. However, as with observer and traditional missions, the 
mechanisms through which they prevent and deter abusive behavior occur while troops are still 
on the ground. Therefore, I do not expect them to have significant impacts on long term human 
rights performances, as the deterrence effect for refraining from abusive behavior diminishes as 
soldiers leave the country and the international community no longer retains a credible threat of 
punishment if the newly constructed or reconstructed central authority of the state spirals into 
engaging in repressive behavior. I also expect the negative characteristics of enforcement 
missions to outweigh the positives in comparison to the negative and positive characteristics of 
multidimensional missions, leading to a less significant and substantial effect for enforcement 
missions. As previously mentioned, it is more pertinent for peacekeepers to stop physical abuses 
than civil liberty rights abuses, and even though enforcement missions have grown in scope over 
the years, they do not concentrate on peacebuilding for the post-war state system as much as 
multidimensional missions. Therefore, since they do not actively work to incorporate civil rights 
into countries’ political systems, I expect enforcement missions to have a substantially smaller 
effect on civil liberty rights than multidimensional missions. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS 
For this study I utilize data on all countries involved in a civil war and a UN 
peacekeeping operation since 1976. To test the relationship between the three types of 
peacekeeping operations and their effects on human rights performances after civil wars, I 
constructed a panel dataset of one row per year (t) per country (i) from 1976 to 2012. For each 
country, data starts at the onset of its civil war and ends ten years after the civil war ends or 
troops for its peacekeeping operation left. Since peacekeeping operations are not sent to every 
country involved in a civil war, I utilize the two-stage Heckman selection model to correct for 
non-random selection. The first stage is a probit model estimating the probability of a UN 
peacekeeping operation using a dichotomous indicator as the dependent variable. The results are 
used in the second stage OLS model to assess the effects of peacekeeping on multiple measures 
of states’ human rights performance. Since ‘human rights’ encompasses a plethora of privileges 
and freedoms, I utilize multiple popular measures of human rights abuses as each takes into 
account slightly different elements of the relatively broad term and codes abuses differently. The 
five dependent variables measuring human rights performance are: physical integrity rights as 
measured by the Political Terror Scales (PTS) from Amnesty International Reports, physical 
integrity rights as measured by PTS from the U. S. Department of State’s Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, the Civil Liberty Rights Index by Freedom House (FH), physical 
integrity rights as measured by CIRI, and empowerment rights as measured by CIRI. The sample 
consists of 57 countries with a history of civil war and 1,346 observations. This includes 24 
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countries that have experienced a peacekeeping operation. To account for the likely non-
independence of observations from the same country, I applied country clustered standard errors.  
Although Sambanis (2008) found the positive impacts of peacekeeping operations occur 
mainly in the short term, measured by two years in the future, I expect some of the mechanisms 
of peacekeeping to take time to effect change. Since multidimensional and enforcement missions 
entail substantially more personnel and more complex mandates, their impacts on reducing 
human rights abuses could take longer than the smaller and simpler traditional missions. 
Therefore, I include measures for future impacts of peacekeeping operations. I assess impacts for 
two years in the future and again for five years in the future. I chose two years following the 
study by Sambanis (2008) and five years to test whether the impacts last longer than what his 
results indicated. This makes fifteen models, each utilizing one of the five measures of human 
rights as the dependent variable. The first five models measure current human rights 
performances with the dependent and independent variables all measured in the same year, the 
next five assess the effects of future human rights performances by lagging the independent 
variables by two years, and the last five measure future impacts by lagging the independent 
variables by five years. 
Dates for each country’s civil war are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2013 (v.4-2013) 
(Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014) and the Correlates of War Project (COW) Intra-State War 
Data version 4.0 (v4.0) (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). UCDP defines intra-state conflict as “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths” per year and encompasses the time period 1946 to 2012 (Themnér, 2013, p. 
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1). The COW database defines intra-state war as sustained combat between organized armed 
forces, where parties can be state or non-state entities, that results in a minimum of 1,000 battle-
related combatant deaths per year and encompasses 1818-2007 (Sarkees, 2010). Though I 
generally utilized the UCDP/PRIO dataset for the start and end dates of combat for each civil 
war, I utilized either start or end dates from the COW for a few countries to reflect more 
sustained combat due to the low minimum of required deaths per year for UCDP.  
The first stage of the selection model includes six predictor variables. The dependent 
variable is simply a dummy indicator for the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. For the 
independent variables I follow the guidance of previous studies on where UN peacekeepers are 
sent. Fortna (2004; 2008) found consent-based peacekeeping is less likely after decisive victories 
and more likely to intervene in countries with lower living standards, while Chapter VII missions 
are more likely to be sent to less democratic states. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) found the UN is 
more likely to intervene in wars with longer durations. Therefore, the first two independent 
variables are dichotomous indicators of a decisive victory and any type of peace or war-ending 
agreement. Information for both variables came from the COW Intra-State War Data v.4.0 
(Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013 (Themnér 
and Wallensteen, 2014). Victory includes a war outcome with either the government or a rebel 
group defeating its opponent. The agreement variable includes a war outcome by compromise 
(COW) or a peace or ceasefire agreement (UCDP/PRIO). Since the original purpose of UN 
peacekeeping operations was to monitor or enforce peace/ceasefire agreements, I expect war 
agreements to be associated with the presence of peacekeeping. I expect decisive victories to be 
negatively related to peacekeeping because victories can lead to more stable peace (Toft, 2010) 
and because winners are unlikely to want international peacekeepers observing or interfering in 
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the post-war treatment of the losing side or remaining internal threats (Fortna, 2008, p. 22). 
Logged GDP per capita in constant US dollars and logged population size are collected from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). Data for regime type comes from 
the Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic) 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2011). The last predictor measures war duration and is simply the number 
of years a country was engaged in a civil war. GDP, population size, regime type, and war 
duration can influence the propensity of a return to war and might therefore influence whether 
the UN Security Council deems it wise to send a mission. A low GDP or a high population size 
could fuel economic grievances or make it hard for former combatants to find community jobs 
and return to civilian life. Fully autocratic governments should be more unlikely to incorporate 
all sides of a conflict into the post-war setup than governments with power-sharing mechanisms 
already in place and might also be more averse to peacekeeping attempts to democratize since 
they would have the most power to lose.  
The second stage of the Heckman estimation tests the relationship of interest. The first 
and second dependent variables, personal integrity rights, refer to the freedom from torture, cruel 
and inhumane treatment, unlawful physical harm, forced disappearances, and unlawful 
imprisonment. They are measured by the Political Terror Scales, with scores compiled from 
Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports (PTS Amnesty) and the U.S. Department of 
State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (PTS US). Country information for both 
reports is based on a scale from one to five that was originally developed by Freedom House and 
with the time period 1976 to 2012 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, and Haschke , 2014). A score of one 
indicates that a state is operated under a secure rule of law where political murder, torture, or 
imprisonment is exceptionally rare. A score of five indicates that the whole population 
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experiences extensive and common imprisonment, executions, and unlimited detention with 
leaders that “place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
ideological goals” (Ibid.). The primary goal of these scales is to measure state sanctioned 
political violence, although “coders are instructed not to turn a blind eye towards violence by 
non-state actors” and use their best judgment for measuring civil war situations where state and 
non-state violence in particular “often go together” (Ibid.).  
Previous literature generally only examines the effects of physical integrity abuses; 
however, human rights encompass civil freedoms as well as physical freedoms. Therefore, I 
include two measures of civil liberty abuses. The first is the civil liberties index by Freedom 
House (FH). It measures freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, the extent of equality, the amount of restrictions placed 
on aspects of society such as the media or trade unions, and restrictions placed on economic 
activity. The measure is largely based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the 
United Nations and takes into account laws and actual implementation, as well as government 
and non-government impediments to citizens’ freedoms. Their survey data includes analytical 
reports and numerical ratings for all countries and territories on a scale of one to seven. The 
ratings are based on fifteen survey questions grouped into four categories:  freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights. Scores from the previous year are taken into consideration, with 
scores for years under review only changing for on-the-ground developments. A country with a 
rating of one typically enjoys a wide range of civil liberties, has an established and fair rule of 
law, allows for free economic activity, and generally seeks equal opportunity for all races and 
genders. Countries with a score of seven have few or no civil liberties, allow for virtually no 
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freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of prisoners or detainees, and 
usually control economic activity (Freedom House, 2012). The data was obtained from the 
Quality of Governance Dataset (version 20Dec13) and includes data from 1976 to 2012 (Teorell, 
Charron, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Sundin & Svensson, 2013).  
Both CIRI measures range from 1981 to 2011 and were taken from the Cingranelli and 
Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2014). The CIRI indexes only 
measure the actual practices of governments and its agents towards its own citizens. Coders for 
the index are also “forbidden to look at existing CIRI or other human rights scores for the 
countries they are coding” (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014). The CIRI Physical Integrity 
Rights Index is a scale from zero to eight based on the use of torture, extrajudicial homicide, 
political imprisonment, and forced disappearances. For this scale CIRI utilizes both the U.S. 
Department of State and Amnesty International’s annual reports, although Amnesty reports were 
used when the scores differed (Ibid.). A cumulative score of zero indicates a state has no respect 
for physical integrity rights and an eight indicates that a state fully respects these rights. The 
second civil liberties measure is the CIRI Empowerment Index, which is based on U.S. 
Department of State Reports. It measures rights such as free speech, freedom of assembly and 
association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, women’s rights, political participation, 
electoral self-determination, and workers’ rights. These scores are also cumulative and range 
from zero to fourteen, with zero indicating no respect or adherence to these rights and fourteen 
representing full respect and adherence (Murdie and Davis, 2010, p. 62). In order to interpret the 
results easier I have flipped these scores to match the PTS and FH measures; therefore, low 
scores represent respect for human rights and high scores indicate a high amount of abuses.   
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In addition to each dependent variable including slightly different elements and practices 
for scoring, each measure has different strengths and weaknesses. The PTS takes the range of 
violence into account more than the CIRI indexes by scoring states based on who is targeted 
within the population and the magnitude of violence relative to total population size. CIRI scores 
do not reflect these distinctions and additionally computes overall measures from cumulative 
scores of the component parts. For example, even if a country experiences widespread and 
indiscriminant killings or torture but does not have many reports of forced disappearances or 
political imprisonment, its cumulative score will be restrained (Wood and Gibney, 2010). While 
PTS scores do not have this limitation, the subjective assessment coders place on abuses is 
critiqued as reducing the reliability of the measure. CIRI creators maintain that the cumulative 
coding schemes and numeric thresholds increase inter-coder reliability, and criticize both the 
PTS and FH projects for failing to report reliability statistics (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). 
Even though these are but a few critiques of the measures, I decided there were enough overall 
differences to include all five in order to get a more accurate and robust assessment of 
peacekeeping impacts.  
The independent variables of interest are the three groups of UN peacekeeping 
operations. As explained above, the United Nations and subsequent literature classify four types 
of peacekeeping operations; however, I combine two since they are more similar in scope than 
the others. The first group contains both observational and traditional missions. These two 
groups were classified as such if their mandates did not contain any authorization for the use of 
force other than self-defense or major tasks other than monitoring and reporting. Traditional 
missions do include minor tasks, though, as mentioned previously. The next type, 
multidimensional, expands beyond the scope of the previous group and includes at least two 
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major dimensions other than monitoring and reporting. Finally, enforcement missions include a 
much larger military component with the authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and are not required to have consent from both sides of belligerents in the conflict. 
Classifications of these groups are based on data by Fortna (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), 
and the wording of mission mandates (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014). As for 
the distribution of each mission type for the sample, traditional and enforcement missions tend to 
last longer than multidimensional missions. Distributions for different types of missions and their 
association with specific human rights scores tend to be more delineated by year than the level of 
abuses.1  
For control variables I utilized the top controls in both the human rights and 
peacekeeping literature. The three most common controls in the human rights literature are 
economic development, population size, and regime type. As economic benefits are dispersed 
throughout a state, citizens are less likely to revolt due to scarcity or inequality and are more 
likely to have the resources to combat repressive belligerents (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 
1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001). Therefore, I expect higher levels of economic 
development to be associated with less human rights abuses. This variable is measured by logged 
GDP per capita in constant US dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2014). Data for (logged) population size is also collected from the WDI and has been 
found to be associated with decreases in respect for human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 
1999). I expect an increase in population size to be correlated with an increase in human rights 
violations. As population size increases, it could lead to a scarcity of resources creating revolts or 
exacerbating the conditions typically associated with civil wars, and with more people there are 
                                                           
1
 To see a distribution of the length of each mission type and its relation to human rights scores, please see the 
appendix.  
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simply more chances for violations (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). Democracy has been 
correlated with better human rights practices; therefore, I expect democratic countries to have 
less human rights abuses due to the political mechanisms conducive to more peaceful conflict 
resolution. Democratic states are speculated to help human rights practices for numerous reasons, 
such as:  political freedoms, civilian control of the military, promotion of civil society, systems 
of checks and balances that block repressive action, and the ability to vote coercive authorities 
out of office (Poe et al., 1999; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Data for regime type comes from the 
Polity IV project and measures regimes from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). 
Institutional features that distinguish the two regime types include:  competitiveness of the 
process for chief executive selection, the openness of that process to social groups, the level of 
institutional constraints on the chief executive’s authority for decision-making, competitiveness 
of political participation, and the extent to which binding rules govern political participation. 
 In conjunction with the peacekeeping literature, it is also necessary to control for 
variables that impact peacekeepers in relation to civil wars. Therefore, I include a measure of the 
duration of the civil war. It is simply the number of years a country was engaged in war, which is 
consistent with data compiled by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and used by Murdie and Davis 
(2010). Obviously, the longer the conflict the more opportunities there are for human rights 
abuses to occur; therefore, I expect an increase in this variable to be associated with an increase 
in human rights abuses. There is a competing theory, however, regarding the duration of conflict. 
As the length of conflict increases, it allows for information convergence between adversaries 
and battle exhaustion. This can result in a more durable peace settlement and a reluctance to 
engage in abusive behavior. Next, since the data includes observations during war and after the 
war ends, I include a war count variable to delineate between war and post-war years. Civil war 
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years are coded with zeros and post-war years are coded by the number of years since the war 
ended. Finally, I include a variable measuring operation resources to control for differences in 
the size of the three mission groups. Data for mission budgets is not as consistent or extensive as 
data for mission personnel; therefore, I utilize a measure for personnel since it encompasses 
yearly change. The number of military, police, and civilian personnel was collected from the 
United Nations (“Troop and Police Contributors Archive,” 2013).2 I expect greater resources to 
correlate with less human right abuses, as those missions will have greater means and 
opportunities to effect positive change. However, since previous studies have established 
peacekeeping missions are sent to the “harder” conflicts, missions with more personnel may 
correlate with worse human rights performances simply because they are sent to areas where 
more abuses are occurring.  
 
  
                                                           
2
 Ideally, I want a measure of personnel that includes as much of a civilian component as police and military, such 
as election organizers, training experts, and volunteers. Unfortunately, there was not as much comprehensive 
yearly data for civilians, so this variable should be taken with caution as it disadvantages the impacts of 
multidimensional mission personnel. 
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
The statistical analysis indicates that the different types of peacekeeping operations do 
impact human rights performances differently. Table 1 displays the results of current impacts on 
human rights performances by peacekeeping operations. Table 2 displays the results of future 
performances as measured by two years, and Table 3 displays the results for five years in the 
future. For each model, traditional missions are the reference category. All models meet a 
minimum goodness of fit to the population; however, the results should be taken with caution 
due to a limited number of multidimensional mission-years. Most models also demonstrate that 
the relationship between human rights performance and peacekeeping missions is best modeled 
as a selection process. The parameter rho () reports the correlation between the errors of the 
first and second stages. Statistical significance reveals that testing the relationship between 
human rights and peacekeeping in a one-stage model would yield biased results. A few models, 
however, do not achieve a significant rho (most notably models including the FH civil liberties 
and CIRI empowerment variables as the second stage dependent variables) and thus may not 
require a selection model. As an additional variable, I originally included a yearly measure for 
battle-related deaths in conjunction with peacekeeping literature. Data for logged battle deaths 
was taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), which 
was designed for use with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4.0 (Lacina and 
Gleditsch, 2005), and for a few instances of missing data I supplemented numbers from the 
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset version 5-2013 (“UCDP,” 2013). However, the variable 
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restricted the sample below an acceptable amount of observations. I then used the same data to 
construct a measure for total battle-related deaths for each conflict; however, I ultimately left this 
variable out of the final equation because it never achieved significance and did not significantly 
change any of the results in an already restricted sample.  
The bottom portion of each table reports the selection (first) stage probit estimation 
results. The three tables indicate that victories, agreements, and population size significantly 
predict whether a country experiences a peacekeeping mission. Interestingly, both victories and 
agreements are consistently negative. This means that the probability of a country experiencing a 
peacekeeping mission decreases with a victory or an agreement. Population size, although less 
significant, is additionally negative. Thus, the models predict that as a country’s population 
increases, its probability of having a mission decreases. Therefore, countries are not likely to 
receive peacekeeping operations if their civil war ends with a victory, an agreement, or if they 
have a large population. While not significant, the other variables indicate that countries with 
higher GDPs, more democratic governments, and longer wars also have low probabilities of 
experiencing UN peacekeeping.  
For the second stage OLS estimation, and relationship between human rights and the 
three types of peacekeeping missions, Table 1 indicates that there are somewhat mixed results 
between traditional missions and the other two groups for the amount of current human rights 
abuses. Model 1 indicates that enforcement missions are associated with more physical integrity 
abuses than traditional missions, and on average score about 0.71 points higher on the PTS scale. 
Model 4, however, indicates multidimensional missions are significantly associated with less 
physical integrity abuses. When controlling for the other variables, multidimensional missions on 
average score 1.49 points lower than traditional missions on the CIRI index. Analyzing the 
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Table 1: Effects of Peacekeeping on Current Human Rights Scores 
Human Rights 
Scores: Second Stage 
Model 1 
PTS  
Amnesty 
Model 2 
PTS 
US 
Model 3 
FH Civil 
Liberties 
Model 4 
CIRI 
PIR 
Model 5 
CIRI Empower 
Multidimensional 0.23 
(0.28) 
 
-0.12 
(0.29) 
-0.34 
(0.31) 
-1.49*** 
(0.57) 
-0.40 
(1.17) 
Enforcement 0.71** 
(0.30) 
 
0.03 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
-0.72 
(0.80) 
1.70 
(1.04) 
(Log) GDP -0.16 
(0.14) 
 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.54*** 
(0.08) 
-0.97*** 
(0.18) 
-0.33 
(0.31) 
(Log) Population -0.12 
(0.16) 
 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
0.55*** 
(0.13) 
0.79** 
(0.35) 
1.76*** 
(0.54) 
Regime Type -0.05 
(0.03) 
 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.08) 
War Duration 0.03 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
War Count 
 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
(Log) PK Personnel 
 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.40** 
(0.18) 
Constant 5.09** 
(2.38) 
6.55*** 
(2.17) 
-0.43 
(2.15) 
-2.14 
(5.27) 
-17.89** 
(8.00) 
Peacekeeping: 
Selection Stage 
     
Victory -0.73*** 
(0.25) 
 
-0.75*** 
(0.23) 
-0.66** 
(0.27) 
-0.75*** 
(0.26) 
-0.66** 
(0.27) 
Agreement -0.50** 
(0.26) 
 
-0.63** 
(0.28) 
-0.47* 
(0.27) 
-0.64** 
(0.29) 
-0.59** 
(0.29) 
(Log) GDP -0.16 
(0.13) 
 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
(Log) Population -0.21* 
(0.11) 
 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
-0.21* 
(0.11) 
-0.21* 
(0.11) 
Regime Type -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Duration -0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Constant 3.78** 
(1.87) 
 
3.95** 
(1.84) 
3.70** 
(1.83) 
3.58** 
(1.74) 
3.49** 
(1.77) 
 (rho) 1.18*** 
(0.36) 
 
1.12*** 
(0.26) 
0.42 
(0.31) 
0.95*** 
(0.29) 
0.45 
(0.47) 
Wald Test (=0) 
(1) 
10.40*** 18.89*** 1.85 10.52*** 0.92 
Observations 154 158 159 145 145 
Note:    Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at    
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01 
46 
 
differences between multidimensional and enforcement missions yields only two statistically 
significant coefficients. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent variable, multidimensional 
missions on average score about 0.48 points lower on the human rights scale with a p-value of 
0.08. With the CIRI Empowerment Index, multidimensional missions average about 2.10 points 
lower than enforcement missions with a p-value of 0.01. Hence, multidimensional missions are 
associated with fewer abuses than enforcement missions. While it is unexpected that 
enforcement missions coincide with more abuses than traditional missions, the table does lend 
some support to my hypotheses that multidimensional missions are associated with less human 
rights abuses than traditional and enforcement missions. These assertions are tentative, though, 
because only a few statistics achieved significance out of five human rights measures. 
Furthermore, these results also favor physical integrity rights. Civil liberties largely do not seem 
to be affected differently between the three mission types. Only one of the FH and CIRI 
empowerment measures yielded a significant coefficient for the mission variables. Both 
measures additionally fail to achieve a significant rho and fail the Wald Test, meaning the 
correlation of errors in the two stages may be zero. 
Table 2 demonstrates that differences between the three mission types are slightly less 
significant for two years in the future. The CIRI physical integrity rights measure is the only 
human rights measure to gain significance, and indicates that multidimensional missions are still 
associated with fewer rights abuses than traditional missions. Multidimensional missions on 
average score about 1.50 points lower than traditional missions. These results should be taken 
with caution, though, since both CIRI indexes and the FH measure do not have significant rhos 
and fail the Wald test. While all models again had negative coefficients for multidimensional 
missions in comparison to enforcement missions, only the same two dependent variables  
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Table 2: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Two Years in the Future 
Human Rights 
Scores: Second Stage 
Model 1 
PTS 
Amnesty 
Model 2 
PTS 
US 
Model 3 
FH Civil 
Liberties 
Model 4 
CIRI  
PIR 
Model 5 
CIRI Empower 
Multidimensional -0.34 
(0.45) 
 
-0.49 
(0.36) 
-0.45 
(0.44) 
-1.50** 
(0.74) 
-1.65 
(1.17) 
Enforcement 0.29 
(0.41) 
 
-0.22 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.31) 
-0.92 
(0.70) 
0.29 
(0.93) 
(Log) GDP -0.17 
(0.15) 
 
-0.32** 
(0.14) 
-0.53*** 
(0.12) 
-0.94*** 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.27) 
(Log) Population -0.17 
(0.18) 
 
-0.20 
(0.16) 
0.38* 
(0.20) 
0.86** 
(0.42) 
1.83*** 
(0.58) 
Regime Type -0.01 
(0.04) 
 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
War Duration 0.04 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
War Count 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
(Log) PK Personnel 
 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.25* 
(0.14) 
Constant 4.72* 
(2.74) 
6.47*** 
(2.45) 
1.08 
(2.82) 
-3.61 
(5.48) 
-17.70** 
(8.62) 
Peacekeeping: 
Selection Stage 
     
Victory -0.44** 
(0.20) 
 
-0.53*** 
(0.19) 
-0.52** 
(0.21) 
-0.41 
(0.45) 
-0.67*** 
(0.26) 
Agreement -0.45** 
(0.22) 
 
-0.52** 
(0.22) 
-0.35 
(0.22) 
-0.45* 
(0.26) 
-0.36 
(0.28) 
(Log) GDP -0.15 
(0.13) 
 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
(Log) Population -0.21* 
(0.11) 
 
-0.20* 
(0.12) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
Regime Type -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
War Duration -0.02 
(0.02) 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Constant 3.75** 
(1.79) 
3.62** 
(1.80) 
3.41* 
(1.92) 
 
3.63** 
(1.75) 
3.62** 
(1.74) 
 (rho) 1.56*** 
(0.53) 
 
1.48*** 
(0.30) 
1.28 
(0.83) 
0.89 
(1.31) 
-0.89 
(0.77) 
Wald Test (=0) 
(1) 
8.74*** 24.04*** 2.38 0.46 1.35 
Observations 157 159 158 144 144 
Note:     Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at    
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01  
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indicated a significant difference. Multidimensional missions score about 0.62 less than 
enforcement missions on the PTS Amnesty scale and about 1.94 points lower on the CIRI 
Empowerment Index, both with a 90% confidence level. Thus, although Models 3-5 should be 
taken with caution, the table again suggests multidimensional missions are associated with fewer 
abuses than traditional and enforcement missions. 
Table 3 indicates that the effects of the different types of peacekeeping on human rights 
take time. The differences between the three groups have increased for scores five years in the 
future. While the model containing the FH civil liberties measure again fails to achieve a 
significant rho, every other human rights measure reveals a statistically significant difference 
between the three mission types. In comparison to traditional missions, multidimensional 
missions consistently score significantly lower on physical integrity rights scales and the 
empowerment rights scale. In Models 1 and 2, multidimensional missions on average score 0.94 
and 0.64 points lower than traditional missions for the PTS scales and 1.45 and 3.91 points lower 
on the CIRI indexes, respectively. While enforcement missions only achieve significance in 
relation to the PTS Amnesty dependent variable, Model 1 indicates that they score about 0.69 
points lower than traditional missions. Even though the statistic only achieves a 90% confidence 
level, it is the first result indicating enforcement missions are associated with fewer abuses than 
traditional missions. In conjunction with the previous two tables, there is also a difference 
between multidimensional and enforcement missions. With PTS Amnesty as the dependent 
variable, multidimensional missions on average score about 0.26 points less than enforcement 
missions. For PTS US, multidimensional missions score 0.51 points lower, both with a p-value 
of 0.09. In Model 5, multidimensional missions score about 2.98 points lower on the CIRI 
Empowerment Index with a p-value of 0.001. These results suggest that there is a larger  
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Table 3: Human Rights Abuse Scores for Five Years in the Future 
Human Rights 
Scores: Second Stage 
Model 1 
PTS 
Amnesty 
Model 2 
PTS 
US 
Model 3 
FH Civil 
Liberties 
Model 4 
CIRI  
PIR 
Model 5 
CIRI Empower 
Multidimensional -0.94** 
(0.41) 
 
-0.64* 
(0.37) 
-0.19 
(0.46) 
-1.45** 
(0.70) 
-3.91*** 
(0.87) 
Enforcement -0.69* 
(0.42) 
 
-0.14 
(0.36) 
-0.10 
(0.50) 
-0.46 
(0.69) 
-0.94 
(0.79) 
(Log) GDP -0.40 
(0.28) 
 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
-0.85** 
(0.42) 
-0.14 
(0.42) 
(Log) Population -0.43 
(0.27) 
 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
0.46* 
(0.26) 
0.69 
(0.45) 
1.30*** 
(0.40) 
Regime Type 0.03 
(0.05) 
 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
War Duration 0.01 
(0.04) 
 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
War Count 
 
0.06*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
(Log) PK Personnel 
 
0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
Constant 8.79** 
(4.14) 
5.65** 
(2.60) 
-0.75 
(4.19) 
-3.82 
(7.42) 
-8.98 
(6.78) 
Peacekeeping: 
Selection Stage 
     
Victory -0.19** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.45** 
(0.20) 
-0.63** 
(0.27) 
-0.51** 
(0.21) 
-0.50* 
(0.26) 
Agreement -0.36** 
(0.14) 
 
-0.35* 
(0.20) 
-0.44* 
(0.26) 
-0.18 
(0.26) 
-0.25 
(0.26) 
(Log) GDP -0.13 
(0.12) 
 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
(Log) Population -0.18* 
(0.11) 
 
-0.18* 
(0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
-0.18* 
(0.11) 
-0.18* 
(0.11) 
Regime Type -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
War Duration -0.02 
(0.02) 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Constant 3.11* 
(1.69) 
 
3.24* 
(1.72) 
3.67** 
(1.84) 
3.25* 
(1.68) 
3.35** 
(1.70) 
 (rho) 3.24*** 
(0.41) 
 
1.71*** 
(0.27) 
0.16 
(0.56) 
1.48*** 
(0.51) 
-1.08* 
(0.63) 
Wald Test (=0) 
(1) 
61.52*** 35.37*** 0.09 8.48*** 2.96* 
Observations 155 157 157 128 129 
Note:  Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at        
*p≤ 0.10; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤0.01  
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difference in the contributions of each type of mission five years in the future, and that 
multidimensional missions in particular may have more lasting effects. To investigate any further 
future effects, I ran additional regressions for scores eight and ten years in the future.  
Unfortunately, every single model fails to achieve a significant rho, Wald test, and/or goodness 
of fit to the population. Hence, the results imply that the effects of peacekeeping generally have 
short term contributions, as found by Sambanis (2008), but the impacts wane after about five 
years instead of two. 
The controls generally follow expectations. An increase in GDP per capita is associated 
with a decrease in human rights abuses across all models. The impacts of population size are 
dubious, as almost every significant result occurs in models that fail the Wald test. However, all 
significant coefficients imply that as population size increases, the amount of human rights 
abuses increase. The effects of regime type tend to decrease over time, although the models 
indicate that more democratic countries have fewer abuses. War duration is surprisingly 
insignificant, with no statistical significance in any model. The variable is consistently positive 
though, suggesting longer wars are associated with more rights violations. The war count 
variable measuring the amount of time since the end of the civil war generally indicates that as 
the amount of time since the war’s end increases, the amount of human rights abuses decrease. It 
follows expectations that more rights violations occur during war and gradually decrease in the 
following years. The variable measuring the number of personnel participating in peacekeeping 
missions is only significant in two models that both fail the Wald test. Therefore, taken with 
caution, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that as the number of personnel increases, the amount of 
empowerment rights abuses decrease. It is unexpected that this variable only significantly 
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impacts empowerment rights and not physical integrity rights, as soldiers and police would be 
expected to deter physical abuses over civil liberty abuses. 
Of special note is the consistent difference between the physical integrity rights measures 
and the civil liberties measures, as the models suggest selection bias is a problem with physical 
integrity rights but not necessarily for the empowerment or civil liberties measures. Across all 
three tables, none of the models with either the Freedom House Civil Liberty Index or the CIRI 
Empowerment Index as the dependent variable achieves a significant rho or passes the Wald test 
with a 95% confidence level. This implies that the relationship between civil liberties and 
peacekeeping missions may not require a two-stage selection process. This makes it difficult to 
interpret peacekeeping effects on civil liberty rights and hence draw inferences on this aspect of 
human rights, though it could indicate that these types of rights are affected less by peacekeeping 
operations in general than the more physically abusive rights.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In general, the results suggest that there are some differences in the impacts of 
peacekeeping operations. Although the results should be taken with caution, as explained 
previously, they indicate multidimensional missions are more effective in reducing human rights 
abuses than traditional and enforcement missions for current and future rights. The analysis also 
provides evidence that there is a time lag in some of the peacekeeping mechanisms that impact 
rights abuses, most surprisingly for enforcement missions. For current rights, enforcement 
missions are associated with more abuses than traditional missions, which is against my 
hypotheses. However, for five years in the future, enforcement missions are associated with 
fewer abuses. Even though there is less significant difference than expected, the results could 
imply that traditional missions may affect more change in the present since it easier to operate 
with smaller mandate objectives and less personnel, while enforcement missions entail 
substantially more personnel. It logically follows that those missions would take longer to 
coordinate and implement activities across war-torn countries. After all, coordinating thousands 
of troops that all speak different languages to forcefully protect civilians would naturally take 
longer than dispensing smaller groups of soldiers to simply observe activities.  
The results further suggest that it might be more productive for the UN to invest in 
multidimensional missions as opposed to enforcement missions. Although there was again less 
significance than expected, states with multidimensional missions demonstrated lower scores 
53 
 
than states with enforcement missions for current and future practices. It is unexpected that more 
rights measures did not correspond with significant and substantive differences between the two 
mission types. With significant effort invested in peacebuilding for multidimensional missions, 
and the deterrent impacts of enforcement missions confined to when troops are still in-country, it 
could demonstrate that enforcement missions have lasting affects unaccounted for by this paper. 
However, this is most likely due to significant overlap in enforcement mission mandates. For 
multiple operations, the Security Council updated mandates as they deemed necessary for the 
situation on the ground. This led to multiple multidimensional operations shifting into 
enforcement missions when the Security Council deemed Chapter VII status to be appropriate 
for deteriorating or lasting violence. For several states, this left mandates and resources 
continuing to pursue multidimensional peacebuilding in conjunction with larger military 
campaigns. Therefore, since multiple mission-years could be classified as both multidimensional 
and enforcement, the overlap could account for insignificant differences between the two. 
Alternatively, it could suggest that the mechanisms for decreasing abuses for the two types off-
set each other, as Walter (1997) found that the peacebuilding measures of multidimensional 
missions can off-set security guarantees without the substantial military component of 
enforcement missions.  
Future studies could improve these findings by better controlling for endogeneity in 
which mission types are approved for which types of situations. Are peacekeepers decreasing the 
amount of human rights abuses, or are the levels of abuses dictating the types of peacekeeping 
operations deployed? While the Security Council’s decision to send peacekeeping operations 
suffers from selection bias, so too does its decision for the type of force sent. This is especially 
true considering the Security Council has been more willing to authorize the use of force for 
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enforcement missions in the past two decades, whereas before they mainly sent traditional 
missions to maintain the policies of consent and neutrality. There are also several instances 
where the Security Council has “upgraded” or “downgraded” missions to reflect changes in the 
situation on the ground. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this selection 
bias, future studies could test the robustness of this paper’s results by accounting for the selection 
into different types of peacekeeping missions. Also, it would be advantageous to know the 
change in countries’ human rights scores after the war as compared to before the war, in 
comparison to countries’ scores before and after civil wars without peacekeepers. That way, 
researchers might get a clearer picture of the overall effects of peacekeeping.  
Future studies could additionally find a better measure of human rights for this topic. The 
five scales used for this project mainly measure abuses committed by the government. During 
civil wars, though, the government is not the only group capable of carrying out large-scale 
violence or the only group that can be affected by peacekeepers and their international attention. 
It would make a more comprehensive study if the dependent variable thoroughly captured abuses 
being committed by all groups involved in the civil war, both governmental and oppositional.  
Despite the possible improvements to this study, the results suggest peacekeeping 
operations do impact the human rights abuses associated with civil wars. If the results persist 
through different statistical techniques and control variables, it could indicate that the larger and 
more comprehensive multidimensional and enforcement missions are necessary to reduce future 
rights abuses, but that smaller traditional missions are capable of enacting positive change for the 
present. It could also indicate that analyses of success or failure in future peacekeeping studies 
should encompass more than whether any party reneged on cease-fire agreements or whether the 
operations created a more lasting peace. The treatment of the population is important also and 
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should be taken into consideration when evaluating UN missions. Furthermore, studying the 
different types of missions is important as each type has different strengths and weaknesses. 
Analyzing which aspects of peacekeeping missions prevent or deter violence could help 
peacekeepers be as effective as possible in carrying out the humanitarian and security aspects of 
their mandates and in ensuring the establishment of a stable and respectful state for post-war 
peace. Due to the duration and amount of devastation of civil wars, it is important to continue 
studying factors that could decrease human rights abuses during and after these conflicts to help 
spare innocents from the pain and suffering inflicted by combatants.  
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Graph 1: The Length of Each Type of Peacekeeping Mission by Country 
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Graph 2: Peacekeeping Missions by Human Rights Scores 
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